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A Different Global Power?
Understanding China’s Role in the Developing World
By Xiangming Chen & Ivan Su
China is now the largest trading nation in the world, with
strong ties to Africa, Latin and America and the Middle
East. This once impoverished and isolated nation has lifted
several hundred millions of its own people out of poverty
and is now reshaping the developing world. This article
looks at China’s involvement in four developing regions to
assess China’s influence as a rising global power.

T

he China where the first author grew up through
college in the early 1980s was the largest and one of
the poorest developing countries. The China where the
second author left to attend high school in the United States
was about to pass Japan to become the world’s second largest
economy, in 2010. Over the past three decades, China has
lifted over 500 million of its people out of poverty. Globally,
China has just surpassed the United States to become the
largest trading nation in the world and is expected to soon
overtake the latter as the world’s largest economy (in terms of
purchasing power parity or PPP). More importantly regarding
the focus of this essay, China is now the largest trader and investor in Africa, with its footprints spreading and seeping into
all corners of the developing world.
How did the once impoverished and isolated “Third World”
country become a powerful force in shaping a new developing
world in the 21st century? What are the positive vs. negative
consequences of China’s inroads into developing countries by
exporting its urbanism to Africa, for example? These questions
highlight China’s global impact that matters a great deal to the
everyday life of millions of poor people in developing countries. In this essay, following China’s global footprints in four
developing regions, we offer a broad comparison of both the
different and consistent economic impacts of China within
and across these regions.1 Figure 1 shows China’s investment
in energy and infrastructure in the four regions, while Figure
2 breaks China’s investment into four specific sectors of one
major country in each of the four regions. Guided by these
comparative data and focusing on four developing regions, we
present a broad picture of China’s widespread but mixed role in
developing countries, thus offering a preliminary assessment of
whether China’s influence as a rising global power may differ
from the traditional or established Western powers in how they
approach the developing world.

China in Asia: Exerting Neighbouring Influences
Back in the last decades of the 20th century, the drivers and
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Over the past three decades, China has lifted
over 500 million of its people out of poverty.
role models for development in Asia and beyond were the
“Four Tigers”: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan. The onset of the 21st century began to position
China toward the epicentre of the Asian economy, with
its influence spreading across the continent through more
trade, outward investment, and other outgoing initiatives
such as cross-border infrastructure development.
In Southeast Asia, China has been trying to integrate
with the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), which consists of China’s Yunnan Province, Guangxi Autonomous
Region, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.
“China's trade with each of the GMS countries has grown
since 1990, most rapidly since 2000.”2 In addition to increasing trade, China exerts strong influence on the GMS
through various development projects. In Myanmar, China
has reached a $20 billion agreement to construct an 800-kilometre rail link between Myanmar's Chinese border and
its western coast.3 In addition to investing in infrastructure,

China is also helping its neighbors to generate energy. Since
2005, China has invested over $87 billion in the energy
sector across Asia, and about one quarter of these investments went to Malaysia. In 2010, an $11 billion energy
deal signed between China’s State Grid Corporation and
Malaysia Development Company included four hydroelectric mega-dams that are capable of generating up to 28,000
megawatts of power, an aluminium-smelting plant, exploitation of coal mines containing 1.5 billion metric tons of
coal, and a 40 billion-cubic-feet natural gas development
project. “With Malaysia reeling from an exodus of capital
over the past two years, the projects have strong support
at the state and federal levels. Officials hope the plan will
attract foreign investment to the region.”4
China’s investment in Asia is not limited to Southeast
Asia, as countries in South and Central Asia have also been
affected by China’s direct investment. In 2013, China established a strong foothold in South Asia when it took over the
upgrading and operation of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port from
Singapore. The Gwadar project serves China’s “Go West”
policy while allowing Pakistan to “look east.” China is
building a road from Gwadar all the way north to Kashgar,
the westernmost large city in Xinjiang. At the same time,
Pakistan and China have also planned to connect the port
via the Indus Highway, which will provide China with a
land-based supply of oil from Central Asia. Given Gwadar's
geographical location, Gwadar cuts China’s distance from
the Persian Gulf, from which China gets 60% of its oil, by
Figure 1: China’s Investment in Energy and Infrastructure in
Four Developing Regions
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thousands of kilometres.5
Compared to the other energy projects sponsored by
China, the Central Asian vector of China’s energy policy has
become more important due to the region’s abundance of
oil and natural gas. While China sees Kazakhstan’s energy
supply a key to its “Go West” program, Kazakhstan has
used Sino-Kazakh cooperation to balance against Russia’s
influence in its energy sector. China is also constructing a
1,800-kilometre natural gas pipeline from one of the world’s
largest natural gas exporter, Turkmenistan, which benefits
from doubling its energy supply to China and circumventing its biggest competitor – Russia. Beijing wins by securing new gas supplies and thus enlarging its already hefty
investment in energy projects in Asia (see Figure 1).

Since 2005, China has invested over $87 billion
in the energy sector across Asia, and about one
quarter of these investments went to Malaysia.

China in Africa: Reaching Maximum Impact
Through increasing trade and investment, China’s growing
presence has reshaped the landscape in Africa. While negligible two decades ago, China-Africa trade reached $200
billion in 2013, which makes China Africa’s largest trading
partner today. With only limited investment in Africa
before the 2000s, China's cumulative investment in Africa
exceeded $150 billion by the beginning of 2014. Of these
investments, close to $100 billion has gone into energy and
infrastructure projects.6
China’s unprecedented economic growth requires an increasing amount of oil to sustain it. In 2012, close to onethird of China’s total oil imports came from Africa, and
China is looking to expand its energy presence in Africa.
Nigeria has received the most Chinese direct investment
over the past decade. While many Western energy firms
are reluctant, China reached a $10 billion hydrocarbon
deal with Nigeria at the beginning of 2014 (see Photo 1).
In addition to exploiting crude oil and natural gas, China
has been involved in constructing an additional refinery
in Baro, Nigeria.7 Although critics have attributed China’s
heavy footprint in Africa’s energy sector to its energy and
resource demand back home, evidence suggests otherwise.
China Africa Sunlight Energy Ltd. recently invested $2.1
billion in developing a 2,100-megawatt plant to help ease
electricity shortages in Zimbabwe, which is only capable
of generating 1,320 megawatts against a demand of 2,200
megawatts of electricity. “China Africa Sunlight Energy is
looking at the possibility of pumping gas to the port city
of Beira in neighbouring Mozambique, using an idle pipeline that the National Oil Co. of Zimbabwe once used to
bring fuel into the country.”8 This power plant is expected
to produce 300 megawatts by mid-2015, and the number
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Figure 2: China’s Varied Investment in Four Major Developing Countries
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is looking to double by the end of the year. While much
of the media attention has focused on China’s investment
in Africa’s energy sector, China is reshaping Africa’s landscape through large-scale infrastructure development.
Since 2005, China has invested more in Africa’s infrastructure than in any other part of the developing world.
More than $44 billion has been spent to build roads, airports, and housing that are essential to the continent’s economic development. In Angola, China is helping the country’s reconstruction effort after the devastating civil war.
One of China’s major investments in Angola is the rebuilding of the Benguela Railway, “an 840-mile transcontinental railway that links the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola
with rail networks in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Zambia. The project is expected to cost $300 million, and
it will provide a much-needed cheap outlet for Congolese
and Zambia copper, tin and coltan.”9 In Nigeria, China is
helping to build Africa’s largest free trade zone in its commercial capital, Lagos. “A total of 16,500 hectares of land
bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and the Lagos and Lekki
lagoons has been earmarked for the whole free zone, which
will include a deep-water sea port and a new international
airport in close proximity.”10 The Lekki Free Trade Zone is
aiming to cut down the country’s reliance on imports, and it
will cost $5 billion to complete the first phrase of the project,
which will cover 3,000 hectares of land. The construction
will also include roads, power plants, and water plants. This
evidence reinforces China’s substantial investment in building Africa’s infrastructure relative to the energy sector in
comparison with the other developing regions (see Figure 2).
However, concerns arise on whether Africa is too dependent on China as results of “high commodity prices and investment inflows.”11 With China-Africa trade looking to hit
$280 billion by 2015, some worry that African economies
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depend too much on China. Some urge African countries
to diversify their economies and decrease their dependence
on China. There are also calls for China to focus more on
human rights and community engagement. As such a dominant investor in some African countries including those
with an authoritarian government like Zimbabwe, China
struggles to balance between the return on its huge investment, helping local development and living up to international norms of engagement.

“

With only limited investment in Africa before the
2000s, China's cumulative investment in Africa exceeded $150 billion by the beginning of 2014.”

China in Latin America: Extending the Reach

Ever since the 1960s, China has been providing limited development assistance to a small number of Latin American
countries such as Chile. Fast-forward to the 21st century,
China has considerably expanded its economic ties with Latin
America through greater trade and more diverse investment.
“Trade between China and Latin American countries
has grown exponentially over the past decade. Although
Sino-Latin American trade continues to remain a relatively small share of their respective global trade, growth has
exceeded many expectations. From 2000 to 2009, annual
trade between China and Latin American countries grew
more than 1,200%, from $10 billion to $130 billion, according to the United Nations statistics.”12 In 2012, Latin
America accounted for 13% of China’s total outbound investment - about $11.4 billion, a significant increase from
the $120 million of 2004.
Like in Asia and Africa, China has favoured the energy
sector in Latin America (see Figure 1), targeting Venezuela
for its oil and Brazil for its hydropower. Of China’s $100
billion investment in Latin America since 2005, more than
half has been energy and infrastructure related. In 2010,
China’s State Grid announced a $1 billion buyout of seven
Brazilian power transmission companies. Two years later,
in 2012, China’s State Grid was chosen by the Brazilian
government to build a $440 million power-transmission
project. And at the end of 2013, China’s State Grid led a
group to win the rights building a $21 billion hydropower
plant in Brazil. Set to become the world’s third-largest hydropower plant and take around 46 months to complete, it
will also create a 2,092 km hydropower transmission line
and two energy converter stations that will be able to take
energy from the State of Pará, along the Xingu River in the
Amazon Basin, to Brazil’s Southeast region, with a planned
capacity of 11,233 megawatts. Brazil’s economic acceleration in the past decade led to a surge in the country’s energy
demand. Given Brazil’s geographical endowment, as much
as 80% of its total energy comes from hydropower generation.13 With power generation operating close to the limit,

In 2012, Latin America accounted for 13% of China’s total outbound investment - about $11.4
billion, a significant increase from the $120 million of 2004.
Brazil is urgently constructing more
power plants using the Amazon’s
abundant hydro resources and transmitting it to its Southeast region, especially Rio de Janeiro where much
more energy is needed in light of the
upcoming World Cup and Summer
Olympics in 2016. To do so, Brazil has
turned to China for its expertise and
experience in building long-distance
power transmission towers or the socalled electricity pylons (see Photo 2).
Besides its growing economic presence in Latin America, China has
made some cultural inroads as well.
Since 2012, China has opened 32 new
Confucius Institutes all over Latin
America, a Chinese foreign ministry deputy announced. Hotels in the
region have begun to prepare for the
increasing number of Chinese tourists by making the menus available in
Mandarin.14 This confirms the larger
trend of more Chinese tourists going
to developing countries beyond Asia
and advanced economies in North

America and Western Europe, making
China the world’s number one touristsending nation in 2013 with approximately 100 million overseas trips.

China in the Middle
Reviving the Silk Road

East:

Tracing what China is doing in the
conventionally defined developing
world has taken us to Asia, Africa
and Latin America. Yet given China’s
huge demand for external energy, we
are not surprised at all to see China’s
growing presence in the Middle East,
whose energy sector ranks second
behind Asia in absorbing Chinese investment (see Figure 1).
Despite China’s massive efforts to
secure energy from Asia and Africa,
as well as from Venezuela in Latin
America, its dependency on Middle
Eastern oil has risen over time. The
Middle East is currently the largest
exporter of crude oil to China. The
share of oil imported by China from
the Middle East was 48% in 1990,

Photo 1: Drilling Oil in Nigeria

Source: Accessed from
https://missrosen.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/ed-kashi-curse-of-the-black-gold/.

49% in 2005, and 51% in 2011. It is expected that China’s crude oil imports
from the Middle East will reach 70%
by 2020 and continue to grow until
2035, according to the International
Energy Agency. Saudi Arabia is
China’s largest energy supplier with
about one million barrels per day, accounting for 20% of China’s crude oil
imports. Iran, another big oil supplier, contributes about 10% to China’s
overall oil imports as well (see Figure
2). China has maintained a friendly
relationship with both Saudi Arabia
and Iran. A number of top Chinese
leaders including Hu Jintao and the
current president Xi Jinping have
visited Saudi Arabia. And China has
been dragging its feet on the UN sanctions against Iran.15 These diplomatic postures toward the Middle East
conform to China’s pragmatic economic policies and interests in other
energy- and commodity-rich regions
such as Africa and Latin America.
But China’s interest in the Middle
East does not stop with oil. “As with
other regions, China has rapidly expanded its economic ties with the
Middle East through trade. From
2005 to 2009, China’s total trade
volume with the Middle East rose
87%, to $100 billion and reached approximately $222 billion in 2012, according to China’s official statistics.
This surge pushed China to surpass
the United States as the top destination for the Middle East’s exports in
2010. China’s exports to the Middle
East are primarily low-cost household goods that benefit the average
Middle East consumer. An example is
growing numbers of Egyptians being
able to afford inexpensive Chinese
cars. Also, residents in the Gaza Strip
suffering from the Israeli blockade
depend on cheap Chinese goods in
their daily lives.”16
As
many
African
countries
have done, some Middle Eastern
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Photo 2: High on an Electricity Pylon in Eastern China

Source: China Daily/Reuters, accessed from
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323300404578202911355634322.

governments have brought Chinese
contractors in to work on major infrastructure projects. Egypt has also
partnered with China to develop its
Suez special economic zone, a development strategy that China had used
itself and promoted in Africa and the
least developed parts of Southeast
Asia like Laos. While China has diversified its investment in the Middle
East, it is much more concentrated in
the energy sector than in infrastructure (Figure 1). This further establishes China’s significant dependency on
the Middle East for energy resources,
namely oil. However, once we factor
in the non-oil related Chinese economic activities, China’s footprint in
the Middle East becomes somewhat
similar to the large scope of China’s
economic influence in the other three
developing regions, especially in several
major countries where China has moved
beyond energy into infrastructure and
commodities (see Figures 1 and 2). In
this sense, the Middle East still marks

the old destination for China’s new
effort to revive the ancient Silk Road
through Central Asia.

China’s Ambitious and
Uncertain Role
Judging by a sampling of evidence
across the four developing regions, we
characterize China’s role as very ambitious and yet uncertain. The ambitious
aspect is increasingly fueled by China’s
abundant surplus capital in both private
and public hands that may have a stronger effect on the urban landscape and
transport infrastructure of developing
countries than on its quest for the latter’s energy and commodities.
On the bank of the Mekong River in
Cambodia’s capital city Phnom Penh,
the $700 million Diamond Island
Riviera, a joint venture mixed-used development project involving a Chinese
company, includes three 33-story condominium towers, a shopping mall, a
hospital, an international school and
two pedestrian shopping streets with

The Middle East still marks the old destination for China’s new
effort to revive the ancient Silk Road through Central Asia.
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signs in Mandarin. Before its scheduled completion in 2017, Chinese
buyers, especially Shanghainese, are
already buying the condos in cash as
investment properties.17
It is again in Africa where the transport infrastructure is the poorest in the
developing world that China is scaling
up its investment most aggressively. On
his recent four-country tour of Africa,
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang committed to set aside $2 billion for an African
Development Fund and promised his
support for a high-speed rail network
connecting African capitals. As a
start, China Railway Construction
Corporation made a $13.1 billion
deal to build an 860-mile high-speed
railway in Nigeria that would employ
more than 4,000 workers during construction, and 5,000 more afterward.18
Claiming no-strings-attached, China’s
ambitious effort can deviate from the
precedent of Western colonial powers
who had built highly limited transport infrastructure for shipping out
their craved commodities from Africa.
Yes it is uncertain that the Chinese
will succeed where the earlier powers
largely failed.
As further evidence on its ambition
to build the developing world’s urban
and transport infrastructure, China is
funding and building Nicaragua’s lifelong dream in having its own canal
since the 19th century, when it rivaled
Panama for control of the waterway. In
August 2013, President Daniel Ortega
announced that a $40 billion contract
had been signed with a Hong Kongbased Chinese company that would
design a route and start construction in
December 2014 and manage the canal
for 50 years. Estimated to cost as much
as $60 billion, an infrastructure project
of this massive scale is very uncertain in
terms of returning investment to China.
Yet China might not be looking for
a quick return on investment, but to
control a trade route independent
from U.S.-managed Panama.19
The uncertain aspect of China’s
strong role has also run into trouble
in the Middle East. Despite China’s

While ambitious and already far-reaching and powerful,
China’s role in reshaping the developing world will only
grow and remain uncertain over time.
political advantage in taking a somewhat neutral position regarding Iran
under West-imposed sanctions in
order to continue buying its oil, Iran’s
Ministry of Oil has recently removed
China from the project to develop the
South Azadegan oilfield because of
long delays. This puts China’s non-political or no-strings-attached approach
to dealing with developing countries,
especially those with an authoritarian
domestic system and a precarious international status, to test or at risk.
While ambitious and already farreaching and powerful, China’s role
in reshaping the developing world will
only grow and remain uncertain over
time. It highlights the ongoing debate
about whether China merely exploits
commodity and energy resources in
developing countries as the old West
or truly promotes national and local
development through its overseas infrastructure construction and other positive means as a new global power. This
debate will not be settled for a long time
as we continue to scrutinize China’s
powerful role in shaping the developing
world during the 21st century.
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